Avoiding the Leviathan: A Strategy to Limit Post-conflict Normative Breakdown

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Avoiding the Leviathan: A Strategy to Limit Post-conflict Normative Breakdown

> In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently, not culture of the earth, no navigation, nor the use of commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
>
> –Thomas Hobbes[1]

In *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes paints a decidedly bleak picture of a world in which anarchy reigns, compassion is rare, and security is fleeting. Fortunately, most would agree that society is evolving more along the lines of John Lockes' vision of civil society, freedom, and social morality.[2] Yet, even in modern society, cultures sometimes experience Hobbes' dark vision of selfishness, lawlessness, and unbridled violence. Such was the case in the summer of 2003 in Iraq and throughout the following decade. A Hobbesian dystopian nightmare became a reality for the people of Iraq in the aftermath of the successful Coalition invasion and overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime. The purpose of this study is to examine if the Hobessian conditions that befell the Iraqi people in 2003 were inescapable. The work will determine if post-conflict civil society, security, and stability in Iraq simply slipped through the grasp of an unprepared Coalition that did not adequately plan for post invasion realities or if there is an empirical explanation for the disintegration of Iraqi civil society and its norms.

Overview

The Coalition strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom called for a quick campaign of "Shock and Awe" to topple Saddam Hussein's regime followed by a brief period of post-conflict stability operations. The strategy required using a relatively small but agile force

to rapidly seize the supposed center of gravity of Baghdad while bypassing large portions of the civilian population.[3] The military campaign was successful, but the Coalition leadership miscalculated the post-conflict environment. Beginning in the spring of 2003, conditions in Iraq began to deteriorate. Looting and violence was widespread, and the first signs of an active insurgency began to manifest in Baghdad and other large population centers in Iraq.[4] By the late fall of 2003, roadside bombings of Coalition forces were commonplace, several high profile government officials had been assassinated,[5] and prominent infrastructure and security targets, such as the UN Headquarters at the Canal Hotel in Baghdad, were destroyed by effective and coordinated insurgent attacks.[6]

The Coalition leaders experienced great difficulty understanding the cultural values and norms of Iraqi society and responding to the ever-increasing and expanding protests, unrest, and violence in 2003. Critics argued that the very fundamentals of the war strategy were flawed.[7] By not understanding the Sunni-Shia divide, the peculiarities of the Iraqi security apparatus, or the general discontent of the populace, the Coalition's cultural ignorance lead to a misreading of the strategic environment and ultimately a decade-long protracted conflict.[8] Perhaps the Coalition could have achieved immediate success in Iraq if the strategic leaders in the Coalition Provisional Authority, at US Central Command (CENTCOM) and in the Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), would have more quickly grasped the cultural complexities and normative breakdown in Iraq in the spring and summer of 2003.

Emile Durkheim in his seminal work *Suicide* hypothesized that societies that go through periods of rapid change (such as the industrial revolution) experience *anomie*,

or "normlessness." The resultant anomie breaks down social and cultural norms and leads to an increase in unrest, deviance, and suicide.[9] Robert Merton expanded Durkheim's work and argued that the dichotomy between societally-accepted goals and the socially-approved means may cause crime and deviance. Merton coined the term "modes of adaption" to explain the different ways in which people respond to the strain created by no longer having access to societally-approved means (such as a job) to achieve societally-approved goals (such as the American dream).[10]

This study examines the Coalition strategic decision in Iraq in 2003 to dismiss the Iraqi Army and simultaneously establish the De-Ba'athification policy to exclude former Ba'athist from serving in government positions and whether this created a very large anomic population. The work argues that the strain of not having access to societally-approved means to obtain societally-approved goals lead the former Iraqi Army Soldiers and disenfranchised Ba'athist to turn to the deviant mode of adaptation of insurgency. The paper further explores how culture influences a society's susceptibility to normative breakdown after periods of dramatic change and how the US and its Allies avoided this widespread normative breakdown and violence in post-war Germany and Japan. Finally, the study considers what measures should be considered when planning and executing security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations to prevent normative breakdown and possible anomic conditions.

<div align="center">The Leviathan Defined</div>

All covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all.[11] Sociologists, psychologists, criminologists, and historians have examined the link between crime and deviance and the normative breakdown associated with rapid change.[12] The most studied and renowned work was presented by the French

<div align="center">3</div>

sociologist and philosopher Emile Durkheim in his seminal work *Suicide*.[13] Anomie

(from the Greek *a nomos*, meaning without norms*)* is a condition produced by

normlessness.[14] Anomie is both a social condition and a psychological state, a general

aimlessness accompanied by feelings of emptiness. An anomic society is one in which

rules of behavior (norms) break down or become inoperative during periods of rapid

social change. Durkheim believed modern societies moving from *mechanical* to *organic*

solidarity become anomic.

Mechanical solidarity is a characteristic of a preindustrial society held together by

traditions, shared values, and unquestioned beliefs. In post-industrial social systems,

which are highly developed and dependent on the division of labor, people are

connected by their interdependent needs for each other's services and production

(organic solidarity).[15] This shift in traditions and values creates social turmoil.

Established norms begin to erode and lose meaning. If a division occurs between what

the population expects and what the economic and protective forces of society can

realistically deliver, a crisis situation develops that can manifest itself in normlessness or

anomie.[16]

Anomie undermines society's social control function. Societies establish norms,

which include privileging certain goals and outcomes. When societal structures,

institutions, and incentives create a disconnect between the goals and the ability to

achieve those goals, then anomie will occur. This, in turn, breaks down the social

control mechanisms as the failure to be able to achieve these goals will either lead to a

win/achieve at all costs approach or to promoting self or societally destructive

behaviors.[17] Under these circumstances, obedience to legal controls may be strained,

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making alternative behavior choices, such as crime or deviance, inevitable.[18]
Durkheim's theory of anomie was further developed by the American sociologist Robert
Merton.

Robert Merton used a modified version of the anomie concept to fit social,
economic, and cultural conditions found in modern American society. Merton argued
that two factors of culture interact to produce potentially anomic conditions: culturally
defined goals and societally-approved means for obtaining them.[19] For example,
American society stresses the goals of acquiring wealth, success, and power. Socially
permissible means include hard work, education, and thrift.[20] Merton argued that in
American society legitimate means to acquire wealth are stratified across class and
status lines. Those with little formal education and few economic resources would find
that they are denied the ability to legally acquire wealth, the most important status
symbol in American society.[21]

When socially mandated goals are uniform throughout society and access to
legitimate means is bound by class and status, the resulting strain produces an anomic
condition among those who are locked out of the legitimate opportunity structure.
Consequently, they may develop criminal or delinquent solutions to the problem of
attaining goals.[22] Merton argued that each person has his or her own concept of the
goals of society and the means at his or her disposal to attain them. Whereas some
people have inadequate means of attaining success, others who do have the means
reject societal goals as being unsuited to them.[23]

Having described the social organizational conditions leading to anomie, Merton
discussed the different ways that people adapt to such an anomic environment. He

introduced a typology, or classification, that describes different adaptations based on

the acceptance of goals or means [See Table 1].

Table 1. Merton's Typology of Modes of Individual Adaptation

Modes of Adaptation	Cultural Goals	Institutional Means
Conformity	+	+
Innovation	+	-
Ritualism	-	+
Retreatism	-	-
Rebellion	±	±

Key: + signifies "acceptance," – signifies "rejection," ± signifies "rejection of prevailing attitudes and substitution of new values."

According to Merton, the most common adaptation is *conformity*. The conformist

continues to accept the cultural goals and abide by proper means despite the

organizational pressures for deviance. If *conformity* is not the most prevalent

adaptation, there is no social order and thus no society.[24] *Innovation*, *ritualism*,

retreatism, and *rebellion* are all deviant adaptations. These modes of adaptation

manifested in post-war Iraqi society in response to the normative breakdown. The most

troublesome of Merton's modes of adaptation for Coalition forces were *innovation* and

rebellion and were also the primary impediment to success in OPERATION IRAQI

FREEDOM.

<center>The Leviathan Descends on Baghdad</center>

For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and in sum, doing to

others as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to

cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to

partiality, pride, revenge, and the like.[25] All post-war societies are inherently unstable,

and many endure long periods of economic, social, and psychological hardship. Yet

some societies are more dramatically impacted than others. Post-war Iraq in 2003

experienced a breakdown of social controls and a significant increase in crime,

deviance, and violence.[26] The anomic modes of adaptation of *innovation* and *rebellion*

were widespread by the end of 2003, and endured for almost a decade longer and

perhaps beyond. *Innovation* was the first anomic mode of adaptation to manifest

immediately after the fall of Baghdad in April of 2003.[27]

Innovation

An *innovator* accepts or adheres to societies culturally prescribed goals but

rejects the normative or culturally acceptable means for achieving that goal.[28] Deviant

innovation in society is kept in-check by the strength of the society's social controls. In

Iraqi society, the combination of cultural (religious and cultural mores, community

bonds) and state controls (such as the police and the Iraqi security apparatus)

minimized deviant *innovation*. Coalition forces entered Baghdad in April of 2003 and

dismantled the Iraqi law enforcement and security apparatus in society.[29] By removing

the security apparatus and not replacing it immediately with another form of social

control, the coalition "unshackled" anomic *innovation* and widespread looting ensued.

Eventually individual looting evolved into criminal gangs conducting organized thefts.[30]

The breakdown of societal controls was further exacerbated by the Coalition's failure to

prevent the burning and destruction of over 70 Iraqi police stations in Baghdad in April

2003.[31] Although the Iraqi Police pre-dated Saddam Hussein's regime and were not a

"top-tier" security organization within Iraq,[32] the destruction of their facilities further

eroded the sense of order and social control within post-war Iraq.

The erosion of social control in Iraqi society can be explained through Akers' and Silverman's examination of social learning theory as applied to violence:

> Values and norms within society are generally negative toward deviance but those values can be distorted, subverted, or misinterpreted to justify deviant behavior, even that which is contrary to those general values. Definitions favorable to deviant acts may be "positive" in that they view the behavior as morally desirable and a good thing to do or they may be "neutralizing" beliefs that define the act as something that although undesirable, given the situation, is justified, excusable, or necessary.[33]

The collapse of the Saddam regime, overnight disappearance of the vast security apparatus, and uncertainty about the future of Iraq were all "neutralizing" beliefs that justified the deviance (such as looting) as excusable, and more likely in the minds of the Iraqi people as necessary.

Another example of post-war anomic *innovation* stems from the disenfranchised Iraqi Army and Iraqi Intelligence Service. In May of 2003, Ambassador Paul Bremer published Coalition Provisional Order (CPA) Number 2 "Dissolution of Entities." The order resulted in the creation of 230,000 unemployed Iraqi Army officers and soldiers.[34] Most of this population previously had very strong social bonds with society and were both followers and enforcers of the mode of adaptation of *conformity*. After dismissal, many abandoned societally-approved means to obtain the culturally-approved goals of wealth accumulation. The former Iraqi Army soldiers protested, rioted, and eventually turned to extreme deviant *innovation*. They began accepting work from the growing insurgent movement and were paid $100.00 to kill a U.S. Soldier and $500.00 to disable an armored vehicle, tasks for which they were uniquely qualified to carry out. Later they would expand their target list to include Iraqi Security forces.[35] Anomic *innovation* was rampant in Iraq and contributed to the overall weakening of social controls, but even

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more problematic for the Coalition was a growing segment of the population that was turning to the mode of adaptation of *rebellion*.

Rebellion

Rebellion involves substituting an alternative set of goals and means for conventional ones, Robert Merton writes:

> This adaptation leads men outside the environing social structure to envisage and seek to bring into being a new, that is to say, a greatly modified social structure. It presupposes alienation from reigning goals and standards.[36]

The occurrence of the mode of adaptation of *rebellion* is rare in societies with strong social controls. The growth of *rebellion* in Iraq, manifested in the form of the insurgency, stemmed from a population denied access to previously attainable societally-approved means and cultural goals. This normative breakdown was exacerbated by some key Coalition strategic decisions that eroded the already fragile social controls in post-war Iraq. The first concerns the first order published by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA's de-Ba'athification decree was a sweeping reform that greatly contributed to the growing normative breakdown in Iraqi society.

On May 16, 2003, CPA issued order number 1, "De-ba'athification of Iraqi Society." The order excluded the top four levels of the party membership from public employment.[37] Not only was this a large segment of the population, it was also most of the leaders, bureaucrats, managers, and experts in the country. Essentially, it was the segment of the population that ran the country. When Ambassador Paul Bremer issued this decree it created two immediate problems: 1) it created a very large population in which definitions that prevent deviance were neutralized in the face of anomic

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conditions, and 2) it deprived the rest of the population of the essential services provided by this population—further contributing to the normative breakdown in Iraqi society. The former Ba'athists had few options available to them; the very nature of their status and their level of expertise made them unqualified for alternate employment. Without viable options within the societal construct, the only mode of adaptation available to them was *rebellion*. They rejected both the culturally-approved goals and means of their former society and they substituted the goals of the insurgency and the means of violence. Many of the former Iraqi Army soldiers would also evolve from the earlier anomic *innovation* to anomic *rebellion*.

The CPA paid stipends to the former Iraqi Army soldiers beginning in July of 2003. However, the payments were sporadic and limited. The payments did result in the cessation of protests and riots by the former soldiers, but no viable program was implemented to provide the former soldiers with skills or job opportunities.[38] The stipends provided some culturally-approved means, but without a clear future and place within society, the culturally-approved goals seemed out of reach to the former soldiers. They would eventually turn to the mode of adaptation of *rebellion*.

The strategic decisions to disband the Iraqi Army, initiate sweeping de-Ba'athification, and not enforce the rule of law in the aftermath of the invasion may have had merit in the short-term to achieve operational ends with limited resources, but the long-term strategic repercussions of these decisions resulted in widespread normative breakdown and ultimately prevented the Coalition from achieving success in their stability, security, transition, and reconstruction efforts. An examination of previous post-conflict operations reveals that the US and its allies have had success in limiting

anomic *innovation* and avoiding anomic *rebellion*. The success of stability, security,

transition, and reconstruction efforts after WWII in Germany and Japan were a result of

two primary factors 1) the social and cultural nature of German and Japanese society,

and 2) comprehensive and detailed planning that aligned ends, ways and means to

form an effective security, stability, transition, and reconstruction strategy.

Understanding the Leviathan

During the time that men live without a common power to keep them all in awe,

they are in that conditions called war; and such a war, as if of every man, against every

man.[39] It seems clear that the failure to understand critical cultural and social conditions

in Iraq by Coalition strategic leaders and planners contributed to the normative

breakdown. In comparison, it appears that strategic leaders and planners in post-war

Germany and Japan had greater success at avoiding anomic *innovation* and *rebellion*

and the accompanying violence and lawlessness. Yet such a simple comparison is

misleading. The success of Allied efforts in post-war Germany and Japan are certainly

due in no small part to the quality of the stability, security, transition, and reconstruction

operations plan and strategic leadership. However, Generals Patton and MacArthur

and their planners had a much easier problem set due to the nature of German and

Japanese society and culture, the comprehensive means available to them in terms of

troops and funding, and the overall flexibility of the time horizon. Consider first the

differences between post-war German, Japanese, and Iraqi cultures.

Post-conflict Culture

Samuel Huntington formulated a macro-level typology of civilizations to explain

the differences in how nations develop and behave. Huntington makes a distinction

between "lone" states that are very isolated culturally[40] and "cleft" states which have

elements of multiple civilizations within their borders.[41] In the WWII era, Japan is one of

the best examples of a "lone" state. Japan was largely homogenous, isolated

geographically, with little variation in religion and language within its society. [42]

Germany is not a lone state, but is predominantly homogenous. Both Germany and

Japan are characterized by a strong foundation of social controls and cultural norms.

Deviation from social norms is rare in Japan and Germany even today.[43] Iraq, however,

is a "cleft" country with multiple civilizations within their borders. Iraq is not a monolithic

society and has geographic, religious, and ethnic divisions. The Sunni, Shi'a, and

Kurdish subcultures within Iraq have different social norms.[44] More importantly, it could

be argued that the subcultures within Iraq do not uniformly share the same cultural

goals and therefore are more predisposed for anomic *rebellion*, at the very least their

competition for resources and control solidified the cultural boundaries

Further contributing to the fragility of Iraqi society was the protracted social

conflict created by the government's heavy-handed state efforts to instill authoritative

Iraqi and Arab nationalism. These efforts by successive Iraqi governments reinforced

the underlying patterns of social, political, and economic exclusion experienced by Shi'a

and Kurdish cultures. Nathan Funk writing about post-conflict societies in the post-

WWII era offers the following observation:

> The resultant patterns of discrimination, exclusion and government
> corruption serve to entrench rivalry between ethnic and cultural groups,
> and generate grievances linked to denial of basic human needs for
> identity, security, participation and development. Societies afflicted by
> these conditions are highly vulnerable to further destabilization caused by
> external pressures and international interventions.[45]

Also contributing to the erosion of social controls in Iraqi society were the

combined pressures of international economic sanctions, war-weariness, and Saddam

Hussein's oppressive rule. This created a widespread psychological withdrawal by Iraqi's from state identity, and a continuing re-investment of loyalty in the institutions of family, tribe, kinship network, and sect.[46] Stronger allegiances to sub-national cultural institutions in society is not necessarily a recipe for normative breakdown, but the adversarial nature of Iraqi society between the state and the populace reinforced the alienation and weakened the already fragile social control after the fall of Baghdad.

Generals MacArthur and Patton did not face the complex cultural and societal challenges the Coalition faced in the summer of 2003. Post-war Japanese and German societies were much more nationalistic, and the populace's commitment to sub-national institutions was not at odds with their commitment to national means and goals. The citizens of Germany and Japan were more aligned with their states' interests and were emotionally complicit in their war efforts. Thus, when each of these nation's governments agreed to unconditional surrender after WWII, the population was psychologically and emotionally vested in the shame of the surrender.[47] Furthermore, at the end of the war, the Japanese populace resented the military leaders in Japan for going to war with the US, particularly after the US occupied Japan and provided the sustenance, security, and stability the Japanese government could no longer provide.[48] Consider that vital rice imports had fallen by 50 percent in 1943, 70 percent in 1944 and 100 percent by 1945.[49] The Allied occupation in Japan brought security and order, and it also provided much needed sustenance for the Japanese people.

The Japanese and German close psychological and emotional bond with the states wartime goals, the essentially culturally monolithic nature of their societies, and the lack of competing cultural goals and means made navigating post-war Japan and

Germany easier for the Allies compared to the Coalition's challenges in post-war Iraq. Although the Allied strategic leaders and planners in Japan and Germany were apparently not anymore culturally astute than their Coalition counterparts, it appears their overall security, stability, transition, and reconstruction strategy was more effective at limiting the normative breakdown and anomic deviance that plagued post-war Iraq.

Post-conflict Strategy

At the end of WWII, General George C. Marshall unveiled a comprehensive and bold strategy to re-build war-torn Europe and Japan. The Marshall Plan was a textbook alignment of thoroughly resourced means and well-defined ways to achieve clear ends. The ambitious security, stability, transition, and reconstruction effort is widely considered a lasting success.[50] The success of this strategy ultimately resulted in two nations that enjoy stable and robust economies, strong democracies, and relatively stable societies. Yet the Allied efforts in Japan and Germany were very effective at avoiding widespread anomic *innovation* and *rebellion* long before the announcement of the Marshall Plan in 1947. Perhaps this may be attributed in some part to the conditions at the immediate aftermath of the cessation of hostilities, and more specifically, the means available to Generals MacArthur and Patton to achieve their immediate strategic ends.

By the end of 1945, 355,000 US troops and another 40,000 Allied troops were stationed in Japan. At the time, Japan had a population of 72 million.[51] In post-war Germany, approximately 1.6 million troops were available to provide both internal and external security for a population of 65 million. In comparison, the Coalition troop strength in Iraq for the initial invasion in 2003 was 150,000 and would fall to under 115,000 by the end of the year.[52] And unlike Germany and Japan, no police force

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remained in Iraq to respond or prevent widespread deviance. In Germany, for instance, the massive numbers of refugees and displaced persons, hunger and poverty lead to armed gangs, robbery, looting and black-marketing. The Western Allies quickly absorbed much of the *Ornungspolizei* to create the new *Landpolizei* to assist in maintaining law and order.[53] In Iraq in 2003, the Iraqi police abandoned their stations and it would be several years before the Coalition would reconstitute an effective police capacity.[54]

The Allied occupation force in Japan was commanded by General Douglas MacArthur, who had great autonomy and authority to execute his strategy with little interference from Washington. General George Patton in Germany enjoyed a similar force ratio and autonomy. Both MacArthur and Patton initially prioritized security and stability tasks over transition and reconstruction tasks. The occupation forces in Japan and Germany were directed to enforce the rule of law and prevent acts of violence, crime, and to maintain order.[55] General Patton recognized the need for order and security and established a Constabulary known as "Lightning Bolt."[56] The force consisted of 38,000 men functioning as soldiers and policemen to provide general military-civil security. The unit received special training and distinctive uniforms and was comprised of soldiers with above average physical capabilities, education, and background.[57]

The large Allied troop presence in both Germany and Japan to enforce security did much to forestall anomic *innovation* in society. But preventing anomic *rebellion* had more to do with the sense of order felt by the populace in German and Japanese societies. The combination of comprehensive and visible reconstruction efforts,

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providing for immediate basic sustenance and shelter needs, and enforcing the rule of law instilled in the populations a strong sense of social control and a viable future. This did much to prevent the substitution of alternate means or goals in German and Japanese society, and thus avoided anomic *rebellion*. In Iraq in 2003, none of the previous three conditions were present and therefore *innovation* and *rebellion* were unchecked. A successful security, stability, transition, and reconstruction strategy must consider the culture and manage the psychological state of the post-war society to succeed.

<div align="center">Taming the Leviathan</div>

The obligation of the subjects to the sovereign is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect them.[58] Avoiding widespread normative breakdown and the subsequent onset of anomic *innovation* and *rebellion* in post-conflict societies is a difficult challenge, particularly in pluralistic or cleft nations. The analysis so far has highlighted the clear cultural differences between Japan, Germany, and Iraq and how those differences greatly facilitated or hampered allied and Coalition efforts. The study also reveals a disparity in how leaders resourced the means to accomplish the strategic ends. But the US and its Allies have had success limiting violence in post-conflict societies since WWII. For instance, NATO's security, stability, transition, and reconstruction efforts in the multi-ethnic and multi-cultural environment of Kosovo were successful in preventing widespread anomic *innovation* and *rebellion*.[59] Analysis of the Allied and Coalition missions in post-conflict Japan, Germany, and Iraq lead to the following recommendations:

<u>Security First then Gradual Reform</u>

In Germany and Japan, Patton and MacArthur prioritized security tasks over democratization and reform tasks. Democratization and reconstruction efforts, or any widespread sweeping societal changes, should not be at the expense of maintaining security and order. By ordering de-Ba'athification in the spring of 2003, and allowing the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, Ambassador Bremer severely weakened security. Removing the Ba'athist leadership from the security ministries not only reduced their effectiveness but created uncertainty in the already fractured populace. General Patton, however, limited and delayed de-Nazification in Germany until security and stability was assured.[60]

The Coalition and CPA became bogged down in modernization and reform programs. The Coalition initially attempted to fight corruption in Iraqi society, eliminate nepotism, and westernize the police force. These efforts required the expenditure of large resources and diminished the effectiveness of the Iraqi Police when society most needed a stable and effective police force. By immediately introducing new concepts like community policing,[61] rule of law, evidentiary procedures, female police, automated reporting and filing, democratic idealism, and completely reorganizing the police from a centrally-controlled national model to a de-centralized city model overwhelmed the fledgling Iraqi Police Service.[62] The comprehensive and quick reforms alienated and confused the police, and some would eventually pursue anomic *rebellion* and join the insurgency. Reforms involve creating new norms and changing culture as much as it does creating new institutions and legal codes, which takes time. Security and stability must be established first followed by gradual reforms to maintain social control in a fragile post-conflict society.

<u>Understand the Culture</u>

Strategic leaders and planners require a deep understanding of the post-conflict culture. Coalition missteps in Iraq stem from a lack of understanding of the complexities of Iraqi culture. The strategic leadership was slow to recognize the growing anomic *innovation* and *rebellion* in post-conflict Iraq and failed to effectively counter the growth. Part of the difficulty in Iraq was the constant turnover of Coalition leadership and staff. The turnover rate at the Coalition Provisional Authority and CJTF-7 (and later incarnations of these organizations) was very high, and each new group of strategic leaders and planners had to master the complex culture and problem set. [63] Furthermore, the new leaders had to rebuild relationships and trust with the populace. Compounding the problem was the constant adjustment to the strategy in Iraq, partially due to pressure from Washington to find a quick solution, and partially due to the desire of each new leader to make an immediate and meaningful impact during their tenure.[64] The constant revolving door of leadership in Iraq in both the Coalition and the Ministries only served to deepen the normative breakdown in Iraq and further eroded the sense of social controls in Iraqi society.

In contrast, the strategic leadership in Germany and Japan in WWII not only prosecuted the military campaign but oversaw every phase of the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction effort. Generals MacArthur and Patton were prominent and respected figures in German and Japanese society. [65] These leaders built strong bonds with the government leadership and came to have a true understanding of the respective cultures. Furthermore, Patton and MacArthur were granted much autonomy and authority to implement their strategies and were given the appropriate tools to

insure success, and remained in command of their respective efforts for many years not encumbered by dwell time considerations.[66]

Resource the Strategy

Unlike in Germany and Japan, the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction strategy in Iraq lacked the means to accomplish the strategic ends. The Coalition effort was under-resourced, and what resources were available were applied haphazardly through a myriad of disparate and uncoordinated programs and operations.[67] Consider the allied countries conducting security, stability, transition, and reconstruction campaigns in Kosovo invested twenty-five times more money per capita there than in Iraq or Afghanistan. In terms of per capita troop levels, the commitment in Kosovo was fifty times greater.[68] Kosovo like Iraq is a multi-cultural heterogeneous society with a long history of ethnic violence. A 2007 RAND study concluded that the level of resources and time committed to an operation were more significant in producing a successful result than the ethnic make-up of the occupied nation.[69] Simply put, at the cessation of hostilities in Iraq the Coalition lacked the troop strength to maintain law and order or guarantee security for the populace.

The key to avoiding widespread normative breakdown in post-conflict societies lies in the minds of the populace. An effective security, stability, transition, and reconstruction strategy must provide or maintain both viable means and the goals to avoid anomic modes of adaptation in the populace. Strategic leaders and planners must have a deep understanding of the post-conflict culture, and they must quickly identify what that culture values and how social control is maintained. Providing immediate security is essential to create a sense of order in the populace. Reforms should be introduced gradually to maintain normalcy and to avoid the pursuit of anomic

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rebellion by the disenfranchised elements of society. Finally, the strategic ends, ways, and means must be in balance. The strategy must be resourced appropriately in terms of manpower, funding, and time to guarantee lasting success.

Germany and Japan are two of the strongest economies in the post WWII era, and they both enjoy stable democratic institutions, civil-society, and the rule of law. Both countries are also loyal allies of the United States. Iraq, however, is mired in sectarian violence, the economy is stagnant, and mistrust and resentment towards the US is high. The US released the Leviathan on Iraq and failed to control it, and so it continues to nest in Iraq to this day. Future security, stability, transition, and reconstruction efforts will most likely be in pluralistic and heterogeneous nations. The US will operate in multi-cultural, cleft or torn societies and must learn to master the leviathan if it hopes to succeed.

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